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In any industry, output depends not only on the quantity (and quality) of land, 
labor, and capital, but also on the techniques used to arrange and integrate 
factors in the production process-that  is, the technology available to and cho- 
sen by  the  entrepreneur.  A  whaling  agent  had  little control  over  stocks of 
whales, but he could choose the number  and skills of the men  who hunted 
them and the types of capital they would use, and he could choose technical 
alternatives from a large and evolving menu. 
Section 7.1 is a brief comparison of  sailing and steam vessels. Section 7.2 
describes sailing vessels at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Section 7.3 
treats subsequent changes in sailing vessels-both  improvements that affected 
ships in general and those specific to whalers-including  innovations in hull 
design, sails, rigging, and machinery and other equipment. Sections 7.4 and 
7.5 describe improvements in construction techniques and in ocean cartogra- 
phy and hydrography.  Section 7.6 describes improvements in the boats and 
weapons used to hunt and kill whales. Section 7.7 describes the nature and 
consequences of institutional change. 
7.1  Sail versus Steam 
It is a popular belief, and one supported by casual empiricism, that the inno- 
vation of a technique leads quickly to the replacement of an old technology by 
a new one.’ That may be true of the replacement of the mechanical calculator 
1. Economists  who  study technical change note that  quickLy doesn’t mean  insrunruneously. 
Schumpeter ([1934] 1961) hypothesizes that it takes some time for the herd of  businessmen to 
recognize the profit potential of the entrepreneur’s innovation and copy it; this delay is at the heart 
of  his analysis of business cycles. Conversely, Knick Harley (1973) has shown that, in the case of 
the North American shipbuilding industry, a competitive model characterized by  some short-term 
barriers to exit can be used to explain the slow displacement of traditional shipbuilding techniques. 
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by the electronic calculator or the fountain pen by the ballpoint pen; it is not 
always true. Often the pressure introduced by firms that adopt a new way of 
doing things leads to improvements in the traditional technology that keep the 
old way  competitive for a substantial period of  time. Such was the case for 
sailing vessels. Far from being driven from the seas by the advent of steam, the 
sailing vessel  reached  its apogee-in  technological development, numbers, 
and importance-more  than fifty years after oceangoing steamships began to 
arrive regularly at Continental ports. 
Robert Fulton’s Clemzont, a river steamboat, was launched in 1807. By the 
1820s steam-powered vessels were crossing the English Channel and the Irish 
Sea. A  decade  later regular  service  was  established  between  England  and 
Egypt, in 1835 between England and India, and within another decade between 
England and the United States. In the middle of the  1840s a steamship (the 
British naval sloop Driver), after a five-year passage, succeeded in circumnavi- 
gating the globe (Taylor 1951, 58; Greenhill 1980, 17). 
In these early years steamships posed no commercial threat to sailing ships. 
The variance in their time of passage was less, but steamers were slower and 
much more expensive to operate. For passengers and mail the new technology 
was superior; but it was not until the screw had replaced the paddle wheel, the 
price of iron had fallen enough to make iron vessels competitive in price with 
wooden ones, and, most important, the prime mover had evolved to  a point 
where the space needed to store coal did not preempt most of the cargo capac- 
ity, that the steamship became the most effective technology among merchant 
vessels. The last development was particularly long-delayed. It depended both 
on the gradual improvement  of  the engine-from  the one-cylinder model of 
the paddle wheelers, through the two-cylinder compound engines of the mid- 
1850s, to the three-cylinder designs of the 1880s-and  on the development of 
relatively cheap iron or steel boilers that could withstand pressures up to sixty 
pounds per square inch (Greenhill 1980, 30-32). 
Even then the sailing ship did not surrender easily. One chronicler asserts 
that “[by] 1865 the steamship was at last developed to a point at which it could 
successfully compete with sailing vessels . . . [and] the demise of  the sailing 
vessel was certain,” but he recognizes that “[wlhat was uncertain was how long 
it would take her to die” (Greenhill  1980, 30). The 1890s and  1900s saw the 
introduction of  four- and five-masted full-rigged  ships that were more than 
competitive on long hauls of bulk cargo-wheat  from Australia, nitrate from 
Chile-until  the opening of  the Panama Canal in  1914 gave steamships an 
insurmountable advantage on interocean voyages.2 The most technologically 
advanced sailing ship of all time-the  German-built Preussen-was  a product 
2. “[A] huge, Finnish-built, four-masted barque called the Moshuh that-I  was astonished to 
learn-was  still hauling grain under sail from Australia to Great Britain aq  the Second World War 
approached. Apparently the invention of machines to raise and lower sails meant that vast sailing 
ships could be operated by a tiny crew, and that a proprietor who had . . . an ‘obsessional interest 
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of the twentieth century. Launched in 1902, she was steel-hulled, five-masted, 
more than 430 feet long, over eleven thousand tons, powered by the wind push- 
ing sixty thousand square feet of canvas shaped into forty-seven sails, and ca- 
pable of sustained speeds of nine to eleven knots. There are people who believe 
that vessels such as the Preussen would have “founded a new sailing dynasty” 
and sail would have remained a technology of choice for at least another half 
century, if  shipbuilders had  been  willing  to take  some risks  (Villiers  1953, 
2-21;  Landstrom 1961, 200-201). 
Steam power became  important to American  whalemen  late in the  nine- 
teenth  century. Through most of its history, however, the whaling fleet con- 
sisted chiefly of  sailing vessels. 
7.2  The Sailing Vessel in 1800 
Douglas North, noting that the last major advance in shipping technology 
had been the invention about 1600 of the Dutch$uyf  (also called the flyboat), 
argues that the shipping productivity gains he observes in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries must have derived from shifts in institutional technology. 
That is, more efficient navies meant  that merchant ships did not have to be 
armed to ward off pirate attacks, and shipowners were at last free to innovate 
the more productive Dutch technology (North 1958, 537-55;  1968, 953-70). 
C. Knick Harley  (1988, 85  1-76)  says there  were no significant productivity 
gains until the widespread innovation of the iron steamship in the fourth and 
fifth decades of the nineteenth century. The traditional technological literature 
casts doubt on both arguments. 
The fact that the  British  continued  to build  merchantmen  in the warship 
tradition until the middle of the eighteenth century, despite their reduced car- 
rying  capacity,  supports North’s hypothesis  (Goldenberg  1976, 4, 80). The 
body of traditional evidence leads to a quite different conclusion. In his semi- 
nal study of the British shipbuilding industry, Ralph Davis (1962, 71) finds a 
more than 50 percent  increase in average tonnage per crewman on merchant 
ships entering London between 1686 and 1766. He concludes that this increase 
in efficiency occurred because of a major, but unknown, development in mer- 
chant ship design. For Alan McGowan (1 980,24,30-3 l),  “[Ilt is inconceivable 
that any such development could have occurred without its having left a single 
trace” in the historical record-apart,  that is, from its effect on productivity. 
McGowan  (1 980, 24) offers an alternative set of explanations. With North 
he recognizes that for bulk cargoes the amount of accessible hold storage is 
crucial, concluding, “[Tlhe fine lines which gave warships the necessary handi- 
ness and weatherly qualities, produced awkward spaces which not only made 
stowage  difficult  but also reduced  the volume of  space available.” He does 
sort of  activities popularly associated with sailing were afternoon outings in the harbor or charters 
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not believe that the improvements in productivity observed by Davis were due 
importantly to better hull design. Either naval architects continued to use war- 
ship hulls during this period, or the impact of the shift to more effective hulls 
was less significant than North had supposed. Hull size was a factor in produc- 
tivity improvement, however, according to McGowan. The average size of mer- 
chantmen increased between 1685 and 1766, and labor productivity rose mark- 
edly with hull size. 
Finally, McGowan (1980, 31, 33-34)  believes there were two major techni- 
cal advances in the eighteenth century that significantly improved per-man pro- 
ductivity: the replacement of the relieving tackles  and the whipstaff by  the 
steering wheel, and the substitution of fore-and-aft jib sails for the square sprit- 
sail and the spritsail topsail. Square sails produced immense power and im- 
parted considerable leverage on the bow, but they could not be fine tuned, and 
they required more manpower than did the jibs. In the case of the wheel, not 
only were fewer men required to steer, but  also the helmsman could steer 
within much narrower limits. Both innovations reduced the total labor require- 
ment and, taken together, permitted the vessel to sail much closer to the wind. 
One result was more speed; perhaps more important was a reduction in the 
size of the crew, or an increase in the size of the vessel that could be handled 
by a crew of a given size. 
Sail plans dominated by fore-and-aft rigging had been known since at least 
the seventeenth century, and builders recognized that they had three significant 
advantages over square sails: (1) they could propel the vessel even when the 
wind was a few degrees forward of the beam; (2) they could be set without 
sending men aloft, which meant that, as long as it was small, the fore-and-aft 
vessel required fewer and less skilled hands; and (3) they were “much more 
effective . . . in light winds unless the wind was right astern. The chief advan- 
tage gained by the increasing of fore-and-aft sails in combination with square 
sails therefore, was the ability to sail closer to the wind” (McGowan 1980,36). 
There may have been some minor savings in labor as well. 
In  1800 there were still at least two disadvantages to the new rigging style: 
(1) in heavy wind and sea the vessel could be overturned by the weight of the 
boom and sails; (2) raising the large lateen sail called for extra labor. For a 
vessel of more than one hundred tons, the potential gains from not having to 
go aloft and from the labor savings of increased hull size were more than ne- 
gated by the additional number of men needed to raise and furl the heavy sail. 
The widespread innovation of fore-and-aft rigs in large oceangoing vessels had 
to await improvements in hand-operated winches and, for very large vessels, 
the development of the donkey engine to provide mechanical power (McGo- 
wan 1980, 36). 
Yet another factor contributed to the level of “standard” as opposed to “best 
practice” technology at the beginning of the nineteenth century: the definition 
of a register ton. In 1773 the British government adopted a uniform measure 
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port tariffs, and other vessel-related charges (13 Geo. I11 c. 74). A similar rule 
was adopted in U.S. legislation of 1789, 1790, and 1799 (see chapter 3). If the 
measure had actually reflected the carrying capacity of  a vessel, it is unlikely 
that it would have had an effect on ship design or performance; but it did not. 
For some reason, perhaps simplicity-the  measurements could be taken and 
the calculations made by  people with little education-the  index chosen by 
Parliament assumed that the depth of a vessel could be proxied by one-half its 
breadth. The law encouraged builders to ignore established principles of design 
and to construct ships that were “deep, sluggish, flat-bottomed, flat-sided . . . 
[and] ‘built by  the mile and served out by  the yard’” (Graham 1956, 78). In 
the words of the shipbuilder Lauchlan McKay, the author of the first American 
textbook on naval architecture, “according to our present law, like that of the 
English, you  can build a double-decked vessel a mile high, and she will not 
measure one ton more than though she were but 20 feet.”3 
Not  surprisingly, the law  produced generations of  “rule-cheaters” (Gold- 
enberg 1976, 4). That a technical bias was incorporated in the capital stock is 
clear from the designs of warships. Not subject to taxes and pilotage fees, they 
were free of  the design faults that plagued merchant  vessel^.^ “[C]ommercial 
competition forced owners to order unwholesome [but, in one sense, cost- 
effective] designs” (Hutchins 1941, 217). 
Sailing vessels that entered the American whaling fleet at the end of  the 
War of  1812 were products both of existing technical conditions and of legal 
constraints. They required constant attention. Because they leaked, they had 
to be pumped regularly. To  slow the leakage, the oakum caulking had to be 
continuously renewed. Decks had to be regularly soaked in seawater, to prevent 
the planks from drying out; otherwise, fresh water could leak into the vessel 
during rains and promote rot. 
“All the ropes in the running rigging had to be tended, their ends had to be 
kept from fraying out. . , splices . . .  had to be renewed, whole ropes had to be 
replaced. Blocks had to be oiled . . . . Spars had to be watched for shakes and 
for rot. . . .  The ironwork itself had to be chipped and painted, and in particular 
the bolts which held it to the spars had to be watched for corrosion and for rot 
in the adjoining wood” (Greenhill 1980, 8-9).  Since even a small vessel could 
have three to four hundred blocks, several miles of rope, and more than a mile 
of caulking, the work was not trivial. Maintenance routines dictated that masts 
and spars be unshipped and lowered to the deck, and that entire sections of 
masts be unrigged. 
Given the demands on them in open seas and calm weather, to say nothing 
of those in foul weather and heavy seas, it was necessary that the crew be well 
trained. Some crewman had to be able to repair and forge new ironwork, make 
3. As quoted in Hutchins 1941,217.  Lauchlan McKay was the brother of Donald McKay, a well- 
known ship designer; his textbook was The Practical Ship-builder (1839). See Chapelle 1967, 7. 
4. That is, warships were well designed for their purposes, but warship designs did not make 
good merchant vessels. See North 1968; Goldenberg 1976, 80. 265  Technology 
sails, manufacture new masts and spars from the timber carried on board. Even 
the lowliest seamen had to be able to work aloft in weather both fair and foul- 
handling the sails in normal conditions, and clearing away and replacing dam- 
aged spars and rigging during storms (Greenhill 1980, 8-9). 
7.3  Nineteenth-Century Changes in Vessels 
Maritime historians long believed that there was little improvement in the 
design of  sailing vessels over the nineteenth century in  general, and in the 
years before 1850 in particular. More recent work has shown that there were 
significant improvements before that date and major ones thereafter (Chapelle 
1967, 279). American sailing ships benefitted from advances in the theory of 
vessel  design, from  the  contributions of  a  number  of  extraordinary ship- 
builders-such  as Donald McKay, William Webb, John W.  Griffiths, and Sam- 
uel Hartt Pook-and  from the removal of legal constraints that had perverted 
vessel designs. 
The legal change came first in England. In  1836 the government, in an at- 
tempt to reduce tax evasion and increase revenues, directed that a new formula 
be employed to calculate register tonnage (5 and 6 Wm. IV c. 56; Graham 
1956, 78). The law did not require that existing ships be remeasured, and as a 
result, although vessel lengths increased somewhat, major changes were de- 
layed. Until a much more stringent admeasurement law  came into effect in 
1855, it paid to buy an old vessel rather than to build a new  Even then it 
took  time before newly constructed, rather than newly  remeasured, vessels 
made up the bulk of the merchant fleet. 
In the United States the legal change came even later. The fiscal stringency 
engendered by the Civil War led to the passage of a law, similar to the British 
law of  1855, which came into effect in 1865 (see chapter 3). Greenhill (1980, 
12, 19, 22) argues that Americans were willing to build well-designed, fast 
vessels even before the U.S. admeasurement law was modernized. Their will- 
ingness may  have been a consequence of  experience. The Americans had a 
tradition of fast sailing hulls, a tradition formed during the disputes with Eng- 
land of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Merchantmen were 
built to elude British men-of-war. In contrast, during the Napoleonic wars, the 
British had become accustomed to the slow speed of navy convoys. The differ- 
ence in behavior also reflected the different types of trade in which the two 
fleets were engaged. 
In Great Britain the most important component of ocean commerce was the 
transport of bulk commodities over short hauls, an activity in which there was 
no premium on speed. In America a small but profitable proportion of ocean 
commerce was directed toward long-distance trade with the West  Coast and 
5. The 1855 law (17 and  18 Vict. c. 104) required that registered tonnage be based “on the 
actual and rigorously investigated cubic capacity of the hull” (Graham  1956, 79). 266  Chapter 7 
the Orient (Greenhill  1980, 22). “In long-distant  [sic]  trades like tea, where 
speed was the prime consideration, inept tonnage laws did not necessarily de- 
stroy the profit-making  capacities of  the streamlined vessel with her fine en- 
trance, shallower hull and long, clean run. In the California and China trades 
time meant money, and in the  1850s the great new American clippers made 
astonishing records for speed” (Graham 1956, 79). In fact, during that decade 
“the great urge for speed caused builders to ignore completely consideration 
of the admeasurement rule,” at least on some occasions (Hutchins 1941,295). 
Both the fastest twenty-four-hour run (465 miles on 12 December  1854) and 
the highest speed ever recorded by a sailing ship (twenty-one knots on 18 June 
1856)  occurred during the 1850s (Cutler 195  1, 12, 17).  Still, the typical Ameri- 
can merchant  ship of  the  1830s and  1840s was long, narrow, and deep. The 
midships section was rectangular,  the ends were short and full, and the ship 
did not sail well. The last remaining example of  this “congressionally” de- 
signed model is the whaler Charles W Morgan, resting in the whaling museum 
in Mystic, Connecticut.6 
In the late seventeenth century, British and American shipbuilders began to 
use models in designing and constructing vessels. These models represented 
one-half of the hull (as though a complete model were split from the center of 
the bow to the center of the stern). Initially they were carved from solid blocks 
of wood. At the end of the eighteenth century the lft  model came into use; the 
hull was carved from layers of wood, which were then held together by dowels. 
Such a model could be disassembled in order to measure the crucial relation- 
ships among the various parts of the hull in con~truction.~  The technique was 
still atheoretical, but it was a substantial improvement  over earlier methods, 
and the lift model remained a design tool through the 1840s. 
In the next decade, following the lead of John W.  Griffiths, designers began 
to work with plans based on mathematical analysis of the important features 
of the vessel. As early as 1844 Griffiths stressed the mathematical underpin- 
nings of design, and by  1852 he recognized the value of sets of plans. His 
magazine  became  the  industry’s  single  most  important  technical  reference 
manual.* 
The development of the design of sailing ships involved three principal ele- 
ments: cargo capacity, a function of both shape and size; speed, “a function of 
. . . length on the waterline”; and operating costs, a function of crew size- 
again in part a function of  vessel size (Greenhill  1980, 20; McGowan  1980, 
6. Greenhill 1980, 19. Bad design or not, the Charles W Morgan-which  was built expressly 
for whaling, not for mercantile activities-served  eighty exceptionally successful years in the 
whale fleet and retired (in 1921) only when American whaling had effectively come to a close. 
7. La Grange 1936, 332. “Plane up as many pieces as you have water lines as long and wide as 
the draft requires. These should be of different colored wood, as they will show the lines more 
distinctly” (Book 1858, 12). 
8. Griffiths 1844, 6; Chapelle 1967,364. Griffiths’s magazine was first called the U.S. Nautical 
Magazine and Naval Journal (1853-55)  and then the Monthly Nautical Magazine and Quarterly 
Review (1855-57). 267  Technology 
24). Designers of vessels for specific trades often sacrificed one or two of these 
characteristics in order to achieve outstanding performance on the remaining 
(as in the case of the China clipper-speedy,  but with poor cargo capacity and 
high operating costs), but they took account of  all three, equally, when they 
designed unspecialized vessels. Square riggers met these requirements in the 
1850s and  1860s (Greenhill  1980, 22). By  the  late  1840s American  ship- 
builders  were regarded  as world leaders  in the design  and construction  of 
general-duty wooden sailing vessels (Hutchins 1941, 302). It may not be true 
that the object of American designers “was to build a ship that should sail every 
other craft off the seas and so obtain the maximum of trade-carrying,’’  but their 
innovations placed  British builders  under  severe competitive pressure; “be- 
tween the years 1841 and 1847, no fewer than forty shipbuilders went bankrupt 
in Sunderland alone (Chatterton 1909, 266). 
Vessels became longer relative to their breadth and depth. The design of the 
stem was modified so that, instead of  “squatting and holding the dead water, 
the ship slid through it cleanly with  a minimum of  resistance”  (Chatterton 
1909, 266). Cargo ships were built with “flat floors and hard bilges . . . .  They 
also had fairly sharp, though convex, bowlines instead of the bulging, rounded 
sections which were formerly common. Considerable length was given to the 
full-bodied portion of the vessel amidships.” The new vessel not only had a 
streamlined rather than a dumpy appearance but was a better sailer.’ 
Of  all the nineteenth-century  innovations the clipper ship has received by 
far the most publicity, even though its importance in the evolution of  vessel 
design is debatable. Some maritime historians, such as Chatterton (1909,266), 
believe that “the part played by the American clippers . . .  is one of vast impor- 
tance to the development of  the sailing ship of any size.” Others, including 
Howard  Chapelle ([1935]  1982, 286),  think  that  “[tlhe  importance  of  the 
clipper-ship model was small, as far as later ship-design was concerned.” The 
number of  clippers was always small relative to the total merchant fleet. An 
assessment of  its long-run importance rests on its contributions to the design 
of  the medium (or California or Australian) clipper-a  vessel that was im- 
portant in both the merchant marine and the whaling fleet. Few historians ques- 
tion the conclusion that the most significant innovation in sailing-ship design 
during  the  first  seventy  years  of  the  nineteenth  century  was  the  medium 
clipper.’O 
9.  Hutchins 1941,292-93, The bilge is the part of the underwater body of a vessel lying between 
the flat of  the bottom and the straight vertical topsides. Specifically it is the point of  greatest 
curvature. The term hard refers to the angle of that point: the sharper the angle the harder the 
bilge. Thus a hard-bilged vessel has a relatively flat bottom. 
10. Donald McKay’s maritime biographer goes so far as to call McKay “the originator of the 
‘Medium’ clipper model, afterwards universally used by American shipbuilders” (McKay 1928, 
293). Even Chapelle ([1935] 1982, 286-87),  although arguing that the medium clippers were 
merely larger and better built “revivals of  the last and sharpest of the packet-ship models,” recog- 
nizes that many of their fittings both “on deck and aloft had been developed in the clippers.” 268  Chapter 7 
From the point of view of this survey, the origins of the vessel are irrelevant. 
Nor does it matter whether the medium clipper was the product of  a gradual 
evolution or of  a sudden revolution  in naval architecture. Only the design is 
important. McKay’s Commodore Perry and Japan, buoyant, steady, and with 
shallow draft, epitomized the small clippers of the mid- 1850s. They were elon- 
gated, pointed in the bow, narrow in the stern, very fast, and capable in heavy 
seas (McKay 1928, 293; Hutchins 1941, 295). The virtues of the design were 
not immediately understood on all hands: 
You  are aware that she [the Lightning] was so sharp and concave forward 
that one of her stupid captains who did not comprehend the principle upon 
which she was built, persuaded the owners to fill in the hollows of her bows. 
They did so, and according to their British bluff notions, she was not only 
better  for the addition, but would sail faster, and wrote me to that effect. 
Well, the next  passage  to Melbourne, Australia,  she washed  the  encum- 
brance away on one side, and when she returned to Liverpool, the other side 
was also cleared away. Since then she has been running as I modelled her. 
(Donald McKay, quoted in McKay  1928,266-67) 
Designers of general merchant vessels did not copy the clipper in every detail, 
but they did move in McKay’s general direction (Greenhill 1980, 26). 
By the late 1860s the grain trade between Pacific coast ports and Europe by 
way of Cape Horn had become important, and by the 1870s the center of Amer- 
ican shipbuilding had shifted from Connecticut and Massachusetts to Maine. 
The product of the resulting interaction between the demand for an efficient 
carrier of bulk commodities over long distances and a new set of ship designers 
was the down-eastel; a vessel that represented “the highest development of the 
sailing-ship; combining speed, handiness, cargo-capacity and low operating 
costs to a degree never obtained in any earlier square-rigger.” Down-easters 
had medium sharp lines. They had fewer spars, and carried less canvas, than 
clippers, but they  still “had  enough  sail area to drive them at great speed” 
(Chapelle [1935] 1982,287; Hutchins 1941, 373-83;  and see Lubbock 1929). 
The whaling fleet was initially affected by these design changes indirectly. 
Many whalers were simply refitted merchantmen, so changes in the merchant 
fleet eventually led to changes in the whaling  fleet (Morison 1961, 318). Of 
the 680 ships and barks in the New Bedford fleet whose origins are known, 
419-more  than 60 percent-transferred  from the merchant service (see table 
6.6), leaving about 40 percent built for whaling. Improvements in the design 
of  these vessels-most  built late in the period of American whaling-influ- 
enced the fleet directly. In an earlier era, when  the industry was expanding 
rapidly, almost any vessel could be shifted from the merchant marine to the 
whaling  fleet,  and  its  owners  could  expect handsome  (if  highly  variable) 
profits. By the early  1860s, circumstances had changed. As the writer of the 
annual review of the whale fishery noted in his survey of the year 1862 (WSL 
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Other grounds for congratulation are these; viz: the greater number of suit- 
able vessels that have this last year been fitted for the fishery, compared with 
those that have been fitted during the last few years; the growing determina- 
tion in the minds of merchants not to introduce into service any more such 
expensive vessels as new clippers, and bulky ships that were never meant 
for whalers, but introduce vessels of proper size, and only such as may be 
built  expressly  for the business, and that can sail at a comparatively  low 
figure. 
The new additions were concentrated in the 1850s and 1870s. In the 1850s 
almost one-half the vessels that entered the New Bedford whaling fleet were 
built to order, in the 1870s exactly one-half. In the 1880s, with New Bedford 
whaling contracting, only sixteen vessels joined the fleet; twelve were built for 
whaling. New whalers were designed along the lines of the medium clipper, 
“with somewhat less beam and finer underwater lines than vessels intended for 
the merchant service generally . . . . [They] were built with raking stems and 
even sharper lines than the usual whalers” (Bathe 1967, 205). Unlike the clip- 
pers a significant proportion-and  after 1855 the majority-of  these new ves- 
sels were bark rigged. They were “sharp-floored and easy-bilged to make them 
roll down when ‘cutting-out’ a whale” (Chapelle [1935] 1982, 288). 
In 1851 the New Bedford trade paper, The WhaZemenS Shipping List and 
Merchants ’ Transcript (9 December), first reported the launching of a clipper 
ship, the Jireh Perry, that was specifically designed (by Currier and Townsend) 
for the sperm-whale fishery. By the next fall, “clipper”  or “medium clipper” 
had become common in the paper’s descriptions of new entrants (5 October 
1852). In August alone the WSL (3, 24, 31 August) noted the addition of the 
Gay Head (389 tons, designed by Wilson Barstow with “fine proportions, and 
general adaptation for the whaling business”), the Polar Star (a medium clip- 
per of 465 tons, with “ends . . .  finely formed, being neither a clipper nor a full 
ship, but midway between the two”), the Rainbow (475 tons, designed by Reu- 
ben Fish; “[hler ends are long and very sharp,” and “[she is] modelled with 
particular reference to speed’), and J. and Z. Hillman’s 400-ton James Arnold 
(“designed, modeled, and built. . . to combine the qualities of an easy sea-boat 
with those of a good carrier and fast sailer”). These vessels all were speedier 
than traditional whalers; equally important, all were designed to carry between 
three thousand and thirty-five hundred barrels of oil. 
In the 1870s again there was an increase in the number of newly built vessels 
joining the whaling fleet. Echoing its comments of more than a decade earlier, 
the WSL  reported in 1876 (1  1 January), “Some vessels may possibly be added 
to the fleet from the merchant service; but as such ventures are attended with 
so heavy an outlay for repairs, alterations and whaling inventories,  it is not 
probable that many such additions will be made.” The next year (16 January 
1877), it again noted the economic attractiveness  of  the new designs: “The 
building of ships for the whaling service marks a new era in the business, and 
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more clearly: “Ship-building has revived, and twelve whalers were built during 
the year, it being now apparent that at the present prices new vessels can be 
built cheaper than merchantmen can be altered into whaleships.” It should be 
noted that the new vessels were added at a time when, because of  increased 
competition from iron and steam, the price of used wooden sailing vessels was 
falling, and when the size of the whaling fleet was rapidly contracting, as many 
of its vessels were converted into merchantmen. 
One change (it is not clear whether it should be called a design or a rigging 
change) affected the whaling fleet far more than it did the merchant marine. 
That technical breakthrough was the innovation of the bark-square  rigged on 
the fore- and mainmasts and fore-and-aft rigged on the mizzenmast. Improved 
winches and lighter canvas had made it possible to handle the lateen sail on 
vessels of more than one hundred tons, but it still could not be handled easily. 
In the merchant marine, where vessels in the twelve-hundred- to two-thousand- 
ton range were common, economy absolutely dictated that the widespread in- 
troduction of the massive sails await the innovation of the steam-driven donkey 
engine to provide power to raise and lower them. 
Whalers were not exempt from this manpower constraint; barks continued 
to require more men than ships of similar capacity. In the decade 1866-75,  for 
example, the average burden of a New Bedford whaling ship was 11.9 tons per 
man and that of a bark 10.4-a  difference of 14 percent. For whalers, however, 
the constraint was not a noose. They were in the three- to four-hundred-ton 
range, and the demands of whaling always required that they carry more men 
than merchantmen of similar size, regardless of rig. The extra costs associated 
with the mixed-rig plan, although not trivial, were not so high that the configu- 
ration could not be employed when the design had compensating advantages. 
The bark did. 
First, it could move nimbly among the ice floes of the Arctic, and escape 
when the ocean froze at the end of the hunting season. (Twice the Arctic fleet 
was caught and crushed because the ocean froze so rapidly.) Second, the bark 
was more easily handled by the few men left aboard when the whaleboats were 
manned and most of the crew had joined the hunt. Since the mizzen was nor- 
mally  already raised, the shipkeepers did not have to raise it while the hunt 
was on. Third, and least important, the rig structure gave more clearance for 
the operation of the two boats near the stern. Thus, while barks joining the fleet 
in the 1840s were less than one-fifth as numerous as ships, technical changes in 
winches and canvas combined with the opening of the Arctic ground to make 
them dominant by the  1860s. At the end of the century, the shift to the new 
technology was complete; no whaling ship entered the New Bedford fleet after 
1877. (See table 6.6.) 
Between the  1820s and the early  1870s there was a nearly total technical 
transformation aloft. Screw- and lever-operated rod rigging and turnbuckles, 
iron-strapped blocks, and ironwork for masts and spars were introduced in the 
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changed both in material and in design. Largely because New England had 
become its most efficient producer, Americans began to substitute light, pure- 
cotton canvas for flax and hemp in sails (Chatterton  1909, 266). The canvas 
was durable, but sails made from it had to be very well cut and set to operate 
efficiently. It was gradually recognized that sails “set like large white bags, 
big-bellied, flapping tent-like things . . .  were altogether crude and inefficient.” 
In order to allow the vessel to work close to the wind, sails were kept as flat as 
possible (Villiers 1953, 14). As McKay showed in the Daniel  Webstel; a dia- 
mond packet built in 1850, vessels with flat-set cotton canvas and new bracing 
on their yards could “head a point higher than other ships” (McKay 1928, 93). 
In the 1820s the typical ship had four sails on each of its three masts-from 
bottom to top, first, a foresail, mainsail, or mizzen (depending on the mast), 
then a topsail, then a topgallant, and finally a royal. A bark had a similar con- 
figuration on its fore- and mainmasts. Dealing with single topsails and topgal- 
lants had always required substantial amounts of skilled labor. As vessels grew 
larger, so did these sails; as they became larger, they became more difficult to 
set and take in, and work aloft became more dangerous. Double sails, each 
smaller than an unwieldy single sail, were introduced to solve this problem 
(Greenhill 1980,28).  “A  ship rigged with this rig was more seaworthy, because 
she was always considered as under close-reefed topsails, and could be worked 
by fewer men than a vessel of the same size, having the old rig.”  Since split 
sails did not require buntlines, reef tackles, or clew lines, the canvas was not 
chafed, and lasted much longer (McKay 1928,250-51,284-85).  The innova- 
tion proved cost-effective and spread quickly. Donald McKay, for example, 
first used the double topsail rigging within months of its invention, and from 
then on employed it on every vessel he designed. 
Because of  the adverse effects of  the tariff-particularly  after the rate in- 
creases of  1861 and  1864-American  builders lagged behind the British in 
replacing hemp with iron. Still, as the price of  iron fell, chain cables and iron 
(later steel) wire came into more general use for standing rigging and for some 
running rigging.  Iron rods were used to connect the topmast rigging to the 
lower mast, iron trusses, to attach the yardarms to the masts. The new fittings 
required much less maintenance; taken together with the quality of the shore- 
based riggers’ craftsmanship, this meant there was less work (and much less 
skilled work) to be done aloft. Moreover, the vessel handled more easily, partic- 
ularly in sailing to windward.” 
In an attempt to eke out the last fraction of a knot in light winds, designers 
of clippers added studding sails and kites.Iz  The former, rigged from temporary 
11. Hutchins 1941,298,382-83;  McKay 1928,214-15; Chapelle [1935] 1982, 290. The duties 
on the ironwork for a one-thousand-ton vessel rose from 2 percent of its total cost in the 1850s to 
10 to  12 percent in the next decade. Running rigging is used primarily in setting, furling, and 
otherwise handling sails, and it usually runs through blocks and pulleys. Standing rigging is per- 
manent (stays and shrouds, for example) and is used to secure masts and fixed spars. 
12. Kites were the lightest and usually the loftiest sails (skysails and spinnakers, for example) 
and were ordinarily set only in very light breezes. They were sometimes called flying kites. 272  Chapter 7 
booms attached to the yards, were lateral extensions of the topsails and topgal- 
lants. They provided some additional speed, but the benefits were not worth 
the maintenance costs, except where speed was of overwhelming importance. 
Kites were the skysails and moonrakers  set above the royal. They may  have 
been “a delight to the more bombastic masters and a source of wonder to the 
passengers”; they were a “curse to the crews.” Their contribution to speed in 
light winds was marginal at best, and there were substantial extra costs even in 
furling and setting them, not to mention those of maintenance. Both studding 
sails  and  kites  disappeared  in  the  1860s  (Hutchins  1941, 381-82;  Villiers 
Technical changes in the machinery and equipment used on sailing vessels 
were also substantial. Between 1820 and the mid-1840s a number of new deck 
machines were developed. They included “geared windlasses, crabs and cap- 
stans, steering gear, improved pumps, cargo and rigging winches, ventilators, 
patented rigs, improved blocks, cranes, jeers, and other mast and spar iron- 
work, such as turnbuckles, or ‘rigging screws.’”” Below deck, life was im- 
proved by new marine stoves and water closets. McKay’s 1850-built Stughound 
had a cylindrical cast-iron tank that could hold forty-five hundred gallons of 
fresh water (Chapelle  1967, 419; McKay  1928, 124-25).  Iron chain replaced 
hemp in the ground tackle that linked the vessel with its anchor. 
No invention was more important than the modernized windlass. Before the 
1850s the windlass  was turned by  the main force of men, pushing on hand- 
spikes. The handspikes afforded little leverage, and raising the anchor was ex- 
tremely difficult. In the 1850s a new windlass, much more powerful and easily 
managed, was introduced. Men were still the source of power, but now they 
had efficient leverage. “It was no child’s play, in old times, to handle a ship’s 
ground tackling. To  ‘overhaul a range of  cable’ in cold weather, was a fore- 
noon’s job; now it is done in a few minutes. To heave it in of  a cold day; and 
stow it away in the cable tier, was positively the very worst work a crew could 
do. Now, a few minutes at the new-fashioned windlass and the anchor is apeak, 
and the cable let run into the chain boxes without delay” (McKay  1928, 213). 
The new windlass was used on small vessels until the ultimate demise of wind- 
driven ocean transport;  on large vessels it was replaced in the  1880s by  the 
steam-driven  donkey  engine  (McKay  1928, 214;  Greenhill  1980, 28). The 
same technology could be, and was, used to raise, set, and furl the sails, which 
made the bark rig economically feasible. 
The more complicated and effective gearing mechanisms also were applied 
to the steering apparatus; patents were issued to cover a variety of new designs. 
For example, in reporting the addition of new clippers to the whaling fleet in 
1852, the WSL  (5  October 1852) noted, “All of them, except the James Arnold, 
are supplied with Reed’s patent Ship Steerer, which is considered by our mer- 
1953, 110-13). 
13. Chapelle 1967, 364-65.  See also Greenhill 1980,  28. Jeers are combinations of tackles used 
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chants and builders the best of the various substitutes for the wheel and tiller.” 
One man could steer a vessel and keep it within a point or two of its course 
(McKay 1928,215). 
In the 1850s new pumps also reduced the number of men needed to handle 
a sailing  ship. Almost  every vessel  more than  a year or two old had to be 
pumped  several times a day,  at a cost of many man-hours. The new copper 
pumps were still hand-powered but, utilizing both winches and flywheels, they 
were faster, operated with fewer men, and could serve other purposes as well. 
In  1852 the  WSL (16 November)  reported  on the advantages of  one of the 
more recent inventions, the Flanders’ Patent Suction and Forcing Pump: “[Flor 
whale ships the Forcing Pump must be invaluable. The wetting of the hold for 
the purpose of preventing the leakage of oil will be accomplished by this pump 
with the utmost facility. Its introduction into our whalers would certainly pro- 
mote this practice of wetting hold. With slight power Flander’s [sic] pump may 
be used to throw water to a great height, thereby  acting as an efficient  fire 
engine.” 
The introduction of the steam engine was the last of the major nineteenth- 
century advances in machinery and equipment, but it had little impact on the 
whaling fleet. McKay’s Great RepubEic (1  853) employed a fifteen-horsepower 
steam engine in a multiple capacity. It was used to hoist the anchor, raise the 
sails, and pump the ship; but the “Steam Tar” could also be offloaded into a 
small boat and used as an engine to drive the boat and to tow the clipper in 
periods of calm (McKay 1928, 233-34).  It was not until the late  1870s that 
donkey engines were employed more than occasionally, and then it was the 
four-masters that were the major beneficiaries (Greenhill 1980, 39). 
Techniques for removing  and processing blubber and bone changed little. 
When a whale was killed, it was either marked by a waif buoy for later recovery 
or towed straightaway to the vessel. There it was brought to the starboard side 
and secured, tail forward.I4  A cutting stage was rigged at the level of the deck. 
Initially this was simply a narrow board, swung out on ropes on the seaward 
side of the whale. A mate stood on this pitching platform and, using various 
slicing implements (spades) attached to twenty-foot handles, dismembered the 
whale. The process varied from one type of whale to another, but in each case 
either the head was taken off-to  obtain the head oil (from sperm whales)- 
or the upper jaw was detached for the whalebone (in the case of baleens), and 
the blubber was then removed. The mate needed excellent sea legs if he was 
not to be pitched into the sea and the teeth of the sharks that normally swarmed 
around the ~ha1e.l~  The job also took great skill. The cutter-in wanted to detach 
14. Hohman 1928, 167. Except where otherwise indicated, the following material is drawn from 
Lytle 1984, 136-65. 
15. In Moby-Dick Tashtego falls into the decapitated head of a sperm whale: “Whether it was 
that Tashtego, that wild Indian, was so heedless and reckless as to let go for a moment his one- 
handed hold on the great cabled tackles suspending the head; or whether the place where he stood 
was so treacherous and oozy: or whether the Evil One himself would have it to fall out so, without 274  Chapter 7 
all of the blubber, so that no oil would be lost, but he also wanted to minimize 
the amount of flesh taken. Flesh in the trypot meant a lower quality of oil. The 
only change in technique was that the cutting stage was eventually made more 
secure. It became “an eighteen inch wide plank about twenty feet long braced 
out from the side of the vessel by boards  about ten feet long, either tied or 
bolted to the ends of the stage” (Lytle 1984, 136-37). 
The mate began by cutting a strip in the skin and blubber of the whale. He 
then opened a hole at the beginning of the strip and inserted a hook on a chain 
attached to the winch. The winch was turned, the vessel heeled over, the strip 
(called a blanket strip) disengaged  from the  whale,  and  the carcass turned 
slowly in the sea. Periodically the winch was stopped and a new hole was cut 
in the blanket and secured by a hook. Another mate, wielding a double-edged 
sword called a boarding knife, then cut across the strip above the new hole, and 
the severed blanket was brought aboard and lowered into the blubber room. 
There  the  blanket  strip was  divided  into horse pieces,  roughly  eighteen 
inches long and six inches wide (Scammon [1874] 1968,238).  Whatever flesh 
remained was removed by seamen using long leaning knives. The horse pieces 
were minced-that  is, many parallel cuts were made in the blubber, but not in 
the skin-to  facilitate trying out. Mincing called for a long, two-handled knife. 
Efforts to mechanize the process began in the 1820s; despite a number of in- 
ventions, no cost-effective machine was produced. Hand mincing continued to 
the end of American whaling. 
The minced horse pieces were thrown onto the deck and thence, by seamen 
using long-handled forks called blubber hooks, into the try-pot. The try-pot, a 
large, cast-iron pot set in a brick tryworks, was fueled by whaleskin and other 
scraps left over from the trying-out process. The boiling oil was periodically 
skimmed for scraps, which were thrown into the fire. The oil itself was taken 
from the pot by means of a long-handled iron or copper bailer and placed in a 
copper cooling tank, from which it was removed to a holding tank. Oil casks 
were filled from this tank and stored in the hold. 
The head  oil from sperm whales could  be bailed directly into casks. No 
processing was required. The heads of baleens were brought to the deck, where 
men with spades cut off the blubber and men with spades and axes removed 
the baleen. 
It will be obvious that the tasks of  cutting in a whale and trying out the 
blubber were arduous, dangerous, and time-consuming. Efforts were made to 
shorten the process, lessen the required labor, and improve safety; but no im- 
portant  innovations resulted. Lytle (1984,  149) devotes more than a page to 
Hunter’s slicing machine, ending  with the  sentence: “There is no record  of 
stating his particular reasons: how it was exactly, there is no telling now; but, on a sudden, as the 
eightieth or ninetieth bucket came suckingly up-my  God! poor Tashtego-like  the twin recipro- 
cating bucket in a veritable well, dropped head-foremost down into this great Tun of Heidelburgh, 
and with a horrible oily gurgling, went clean out of  sight!” Queequeg delivers him by  cesarean 
section, conducted with a boarding-sword. (Melville [  185 I] 1983, 35 1-52). Bailing the case. This drawing and the next four come from the journal of an anony- 
mous crewman aboard the whaling bark Clara Bell of Mattapoisett, Massachusetts, in 
the 1850s. They were first reproduced to illustrate Haley 1948. 
The case is the upper part of the head of the sperm whale; case oil is very pure and 
could be stored without processing. It’s also very slippery, as one of  these crewmen is 
discovering: “[Tlhe clear, snow-white spermaceti [is] bailed or scooped out; the men 
plunging waist-deep in the pulpy, cellular ooze” (Church 1938,36). Oil was bailed from 
the case without bringing the head on deck when the whale was very large; the crewman 
stood on the head as it was suspended over the sea from the side of the vessel. 
Cutting up the junk. The  junk is the central section of the head of the sperm whale. The 
oil it contains had to be extracted by  trying out. These men are cutting the junk into 
pieces small enough to fit in the try-pots, using spades. Stripping ivory. The ivory is the sperm whale’s teeth, which will be used by these fel- 
lows and their shipmates for scrimshaw, “perhaps the only indigenous Yankee handi- 
craft.’’ Scrimshaw includes a variety of carved articles, ranging from pictures engraved 
on the teeth to implements for use in the kitchen, such as pie wheels (Murphy 1967, 16). 
Hoisting the blanket strip. Note the men balanced somewhat precariously on the cutting 
stage, and the sharks swimming around the carcass. 277  Technology 
Trying out the horse pieces. The man at the far side of the tryworks is using a blubber 
hook to add a minced horse piece to the try-pot (minced horse pieces were also called 
bible leaves). His companion is stoking the fire. 
Hunter’s blubber-cutting machine ever having been used.” Another page and a 
half on Ricketson’s mincing machine end, “Ricketson’s machine was not practi- 
cal and it is doubtful that it was ever used”  (152). Finally, there is Hunter’s 
tryworks; two pages describing its advantages end, “There is no record of a 
whaleship using Hunter’s mechanical  tryworks” (165). Innovations in vessel 
design made whalers more productive, but the processes of cutting in and try- 
ing out did not change significantly from the beginning  to the end of New 
Bedford whaling. 
The only major innovation in bone production was the introduction of im- 
proved winches  to move the baleen.  (This account is taken from Bockstoce 
1986, 79-85.)  The baleen  operation began when a boatsteerer-usually  the 
one who  had  first  harpooned the  whale-dropped  down onto the  carcass, 
lashed to the side of the vessel, and began removing the whale’s lip. Holes were 
cut in the lip to accommodate hooks attached to lines carried inboard, cuts 
were made at the base of the lip, and the lip was hauled aboard. 
The boatsteerer-in  this capacity known as the monkey-now  began to cut 
the whalebone free of the upper jaw, using a spade. The position of the whale 
was periodically shifted, by putting pressure on the blanket piece, to permit the 
monkey to cut away the baleen across the entire upper jaw. When the baleen, an 
enormous structure weighing as much as two thousand pounds, had been cut 
free, it was winched aboard. 
Then the baleen was split into sections, the first step in a series that divided 
the clumps of baleen. The remaining steps-cleaning  and drying-were  car- 
ried out over an extended period following the removal and trying out of  the 
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by scraping the bone with coconut shells or knives. This job and the drying out 
had to be done with great care, since improper handling could  mean  a loss 
of value. 
7.4  Improvements in Shipbuilding Methods 
Throughout the first two-thirds  of  the nineteenth century, Americans could 
buy vessels from the world’s most efficient shipbuilding industry. In 1776  fully 
one-third of all British-owned vessels were American-built (McGowan  1980, 
27), and the economic advantage that underlay that degree of market penetra- 
tion increased for the next seventy-five years. Some of the advantage was, of 
course, due to the low price of  timber, but it also rested on a more efficient 
production technology. “Working in a small, almost barren yard with a con- 
stantly changing labor force . . . the energetic colonial builder could produce 
two ships a year, in comparison with the one launched by the English counter- 
part” (Goldenberg  1976, 71). Despite the increasing size and complexity of 
vessels, American builders held to that schedule throughout most of the nine- 
teenth century. Even after 1870 when the American advantage in wooden ship- 
building was beginning to be undercut, it usually took only four or five months 
to complete the hull of  a typical ship or bark, and six months for the hull of 
even the largest. The keel of the 3,401-ton schooner Eleanor A. Percy, for ex- 
ample, was laid in March  1900 and the vessel launched in October (Hutchins 
1941, 396). 
Between the 1820s and midcentury, American builders gradually introduced 
new construction techniques.  Steam-driven saws meant frames could be cut 
and beveled-the  most difficult single task-with  one-sixth less labor, but dif- 
fusion was slow outside the most progressive yards. While most Maine ship- 
builders were using steam saws by the early 1870s, the first such plant to open 
in  Bath  (the  state’s  shipbuilding  center)  used  equipment  imported  from 
McKay’s Boston  yard  after his  1869 bankruptcy.  McKay  had  been  using  a 
steam-driven tilting saw for twenty years (Bathe 1967,207). Planking was also 
cut, tapered, and beveled in steam-driven mills. Power-driven lathes were de- 
veloped to cut the treenails (wooden pins) that fastened the timbers of the hull 
together; the yards’ blacksmith shops developed metalworking techniques and 
by the 1840s were importing machine tools from Europe. At that time, steam 
winches  had  generally  replaced  horses  as  the  source  of  stationary  power 
(Hutchins 1941, 330-31). 
“In most yards . . . large sheds, open on one side, were provided for hewing 
and fashioning in bad weather” (Hutchins  1941, 395). The most prosperous 
firms constructed ship houses for building  vessels indoors. Before  1850 only 
two navy yards were so endowed (Chapelle 1967,279).  By the Civil War, large, 
progressive builders had adopted most of these improvements, but there were 
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Progress was also made in providing better-quality vessels. For example, 
before the 1840s the life of a vessel was often cut short by rot in the keelsons- 
the beams (usually three) that run lengthwise above the keel to provide a ship’s 
structural foundation. Captain R. B. Forbes solved this problem by hollowing 
tunnels in the keelson timbers and filling them with salt pickle. Connecting 
pipes permitted the pickle to be replaced when the timbers had absorbed the 
current supply (McKay 1928,45-46). 
Not all problems were solved. As the virgin forests were cut, builders of 
wooden ships faced a shortage of curved timbers to use for frames. What was 
needed was a machine that could bend timbers to shape. Despite numerous 
experiments  with  clamps  and  steam boxes,  and  some partial  success  (the 
Ocean Bird  [1853], the Pawnee [1858], and the 1,147-ton New Era [1870]), 
the process remained too costly to be profitable (Hutchins 1941, 395). 
The existence of small yards attests to the fact that, as late as midcentury, 
there were few economies of  scale to be captured. Despite the emergence of 
Maine as the major shipbuilding center and concentrations of activity in Mas- 
sachusetts, Connecticut, the Hudson River valley, and the Chesapeake, ships 
were built in small yards up and down the Atlantic coast (Moms 1979, 164). 
By the 187Os, however, the new technology began to show evidence of increas- 
ing returns. The number  of  American  yards declined. Donald  McKay was 
among those who failed, but the decline was concentrated among the smaller 
yards. Remaining firms grew larger. They expanded their facilities to incorpo- 
rate the latest technology, and managed to capture the available scale econo- 
mies (1989, but in wooden-ship construction these were never comparable to 
the economies available to builders of iron or steel hulls. 
7.5  Improvements in Oceanography and Cartography 
A summary of the developments that increased productivity in ocean ship- 
ping  in  general, and  in  whaling  in particular, must include innovations in 
oceanography and cartography, as well as the explorations on which more pre- 
cise maps and charts were based. There was nothing new about exploring vir- 
gin waters and mapping their navigational hazards; sailors had always made 
charts. What was different was the extent of the area that was sailed for the first 
time between the late eighteenth century and 1900, and the degree to which 
governments professionalized  what  had  been  a  largely  amateur  enterprise. 
Moreover, “[iln the life of sail, storms were less to be feared than calms, and 
unlike the steamship which could . . .  travel the shortest distance between two 
points, the sailing ship route varied greatly according to seasonal winds and 
currents. Until the middle of the nineteenth century, there was no systematic 
research on ocean currents, winds and weather (Graham 1956, 81). 
The British navy had been involved in both cartographic and hydrographic 
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1770s. The history  of American government efforts is intimately associated 
with the evolution of the U.S. Navy’s Depot of Charts and Instruments (later 
the US. Hydrographic Office) and two of its early directors, Charles Wilkes 
and Matthew Fontaine Maury.I6 
Beginning in the early 1830s Congress enacted a series of laws calling for 
naval  surveys of  areas of  particular  maritime  concern.  In  1836 an act was 
passed calling for the exploration and survey of the Pacific coast and the South 
Seas, in order “to determine the existence of doubtful dangers reported in the 
track of the United States trade, to make astronomical observations for locating 
shoals, islands, reefs, etc.; observations of terrestrial magnetism, variation of 
the compass, etc.” 
Two years later the government sent out the U.S. Exploring Expedition, with 
Wilkes in command.lX  In 1837 the depot published four charts resulting from 
surveys made by American naval officers; over the next five years it published 
eighty-seven more, nearly all products of Wilkes’s expedition. Upon his return 
in  1842, Congress approved the publication of  an account of his discoveries; 
between  1844 and  1874 eleven  atlases and  twenty-four  volumes,  including 
Wilkes’s famous volume 23, Hydrography, were produced. Both the charts and 
the Wilkes volumes were made available to shipowners and sea  captain^.'^ 
Although Wilkes’s expedition was by  far the most famous, it was not the 
last of those government-funded scientific enterprises. On 3 August 1852, for 
example, the WSL  reported that the Senate was considering “a bill ‘to authorize 
an exploration and reconnoisance  [sic] of  the courses of  navigation  used by 
whalers’ in the regions of Behring’s Straits; also such parts of the China Seas, 
Straits of Gaspar, and Java sea as lie directly in the route of vessels proceeding 
to and from China.” The editor applauded the measure because “the number of 
whale ships now cruising in those seas is about 250, and it is generally admit- 
ted that nearly all the charts of that remote portion of the globe are very imper- 
fect.” Late in August Congress approved, and within a year the North Pacific 
Exploring and Surveying Expedition, which was to last six years, was launched 
(Stats.  at Large of USA 10:104).  It was first commanded by Cadwalader Ring- 
gold, who had  been  a member  of Wilkes’s expedition  fifteen years  before, 
16. Wilkes is one of  four candidates for discoverer of Antarctica. The others are a French naval 
lieutenant and two American sealers. The story of  one of the sealers-Nathaniel  B. Palmer of the 
sloop Hero-is  told in Colby 1990,57-61. 
17. In 1832, for example, Congress appropriated $20,000 to carry out the coastal survey author- 
ized in 1807 (An Act to Carry into Effect the Act to Provide for a Survey of the Coast of the United 
States, 1832, Stats. at Large of  USA  4570-71).  The 1836 act was An Act Making Appropriations 
for the Naval Service, for the Year 1836 (Stats. at Large of  USA 5:27-29). The quotation is from 
the 1924 Annuul Report of  the Hydrographic Ofice as quoted by Weber 1926, 12. See also US. 
Navy  1952.204. 
18. For a thorough and beautifully illustrated account of  the expedition,  see Viola and Mar- 
golis 1985. 
19. Weber 1926, 13. The act of Congress was An Act to Provide for Publishing an Account of 
the Discoveries Made by  the Exploring Expedition, under the Command of  Lieutenant Wilkes, of 
the United States Navy, 1842, Sratx at Large of  USA 5534. Although it directed the publication 
of only one hundred copies, subsequent acts provided for reprints and their distribution. 281  Technology 
and then by John Rodgers.*O Between 1853 and 1859 the expedition produced 
enough information  to enable the  government  “to publish detailed coasting 
charts of  the entire coast of  Japan, the coasts and islands of the Bering Sea, 
and of a portion of the Arctic Ocean (Weber 1926, 19). 
Wilkes became famous for his expeditions; Matthew Fontaine Maury sel- 
dom left Washington between  l  October  1844, when he took over the com- 
mand of the depot, and 1861, when he joined the Confederate Navy. Wilkes’s 
contributions lay in the accuracy of the notes and measurements that he made 
personally, Maury’s, in his ability to collect and synthesize the notes and mea- 
surements of others. Wilkes provided the basis for a generation of  maps and 
charts, Maury, for the scientific study of hydrography and for most sailing di- 
rections for the rest of the century. 
Maury was not the first hydrographer, but his work stands out because of its 
breadth and attention to detail (Villiers  1953, 78-79).  He made no attempt to 
do all of the work himself. Instead, he tried to recruit the help of all the nation’s 
sea captains, and managed to recruit a substantial number. Each cooperating 
captain was furnished with a set of forms on which he was asked to report- 
on a day-by-day basis-his  ship’s destination and location, the mileage sailed, 
the ocean currents encountered, wind speed, air pressure and temperature, wa- 
ter  temperature,  and  any  other  marine  and  meteorological  phenomena  he 
thought pertinent (McKay  1928, 115-16;  Weber  1926, 17). Maury collected, 
synthesized, and analyzed these reports. He plotted on a single chart the tracks 
of several hundred ships traveling from one specific port to another but travel- 
ing in different years and in different seasons-noting  along each track the 
winds and currents encountered each day. 
The statistics gathered in these working charts-charts  based on the com- 
bined experience of a sizable fraction of the nation’s navy and merchant cap- 
tains-gave  Maury the evidence he needed to generalize about ocean condi- 
tions (Graham  1956, 82). He established the best routes  for sailing ships at 
various times of year on all the standard voyages. He did not claim that “there 
was one sailing route, and only one: but at each season of the year, there was 
very definitely a best way” from one port to another. Certainly there were varia- 
tions in the weather, but Maury’s routes were best for average conditions in any 
given month, or even week (Villiers 1953,79). His charts included information 
on winds and currents, ocean temperatures, and even magnetic influences on a 
20. John Rodgers came of a distinguished naval family. His father, John, “fired . . .  the first shot 
in the war” of  1812 and at the conclusion of the war was offered the position of secretary of the 
navy, which he turned down. The son surveyed the coast of Florida in  1840-43  and 1849-52  and 
took part in the expedition to chart the North Pacific in  1852-55.  In  1855, in command of  the 
Kncennes, he explored the Arctic Ocean. From then until 1861, when he began his service in the 
Civil War, he participated in writing the report of  the explorations in which he had  taken part. 
After the war Rodgers was the commandant of  the Boston Navy Yard, commanded the Asiatic 
fleet, and ended his career as superintendent of the US.  Naval Observatory in Washington, DC, 
where “under his administration Prof. Asaph Hall discovered the moons of  Mars’’ (Appletons’ 
Cyclopaedia ofAmerican Biography 1888,5:297). 282  Chapter 7 
vessel’s compass (Graham 1956, 82). As Maury said, “[Tlhus the young mari- 
ner . . . would here find at once that he had already the experience of a thousand 
navigators to guide him on his voyage.”** 
The results of  Maury’s work were published  in a series that came to be 
known as Wind and Current Charts and in his ten-volume Sailing Directions. 
There were six series of Wind and Current Charts: Track Charts, Trade-Wind 
Charts, Pilot  Charts, Whale  Charts,  Thermal  Charts,  and  Storm and  Rain 
Charts. Together they covered such diverse topics as the “prevailing winds and 
currents, their limits and general characteristics, and, in general, all the physi- 
cal features of the ocean, including its meteorology, the limits of icebergs, the 
feeding ground of whales, and all the facts of interest and value to the maritime 
community.”22  Maury oversaw eight editions of  Sailing Directions. The first 
three track charts were issued in 1848. The rest, as well as the “other series of 
Wind and Current Charts were issued from time to time, as they were succe- 
sively completed, and their coverage was gradually extended to include every 
navigatable sea” (Weber 1926, 18). 
The impact of Maury’s work on the lengths of voyages was dramatic. By the 
early  1850s, for example, the average passage from an East Coast port to the 
Equator had been reduced from forty-one to thirty-one days. One Baltimore 
captain even made the run in twenty-four. The average passage from England 
to Australia via the Cape of Good Hope-eleven  thousand miles-had  taken 
125 days. With the new charts it was reduced to 92 (Graham 1956,82). 
It is not surprising that Maury’s work was rapidly diffused. During his tenure 
the depot issued and distributed free, “to merchant vessels alone, twenty thou- 
sand copies of  Sailing Directions, and two hundred thousand copies of Wind 
and Current Charts.” During the same time, the depot engraved, published, and 
oversaw the distribution of an additional forty-four general sailing charts that 
depended both on Maury’s work and on the explorations of Rodgers and Com- 
modore Perry (Weber 1926, 18). 
In the fifteen years after  1850, whaling and merchant captains benefitted 
also from a worldwide expansion of the network of lighthouses and from the 
introduction of  other aids to navigation, such as channel buoys, in restricted 
waters. In 1861 the east and west coasts of the United States were joined by the 
electric telegraph, and New Bedford agents could communicate with whalers 
reprovisioning in San Francisco. The Civil War hastened the expansion of the 
domestic telegraph net; news of markets and prices now diffused quickly, and 
21. Quoted in Graham 1956, 82. Maury’s work was beneficial chiefly to merchant ships sailing 
from port to port on predetermined schedules, but whalers gained as well. Not only were captains 
able to choose the best routes on their outbound voyages to the Indian, Pacific, and Western Arctic 
Oceans and on the return trip to New Bedford, but they were able to choose the best tracks to take 
as they shifted operations from the Arctic to the New Zealand grounds or from the Sea of Okhotsk 
to the northwest coast of the United States. And, of course, whalers alone reaped the benefits of 
Maury’s whaling charts. 
22. Commander Bartlett to the National Academy of Sciences, letter about Maury’s activities, 
quoted in Report of the Joint Commission 1886, 26-27. 283  Technology 
the performance of markets improved. The Atlantic cable-linking  the United 
States, through Great Britain and the Channel cable, with the now very fully 
articulated Continental system-was  opened in  1866; it proved a great boon 
for oil merchants in need of  market information. In the  1870s the European 
systems spread to take in Scandinavia, Russia, the Middle East, India, Austra- 
lia, and New Zealand. 
For whaling agents this meant contact with more reprovisioning  and ship- 
ping points, and easier control of  ventures. The rapid expansion of the Latin 
American systems in the 1870s and their connection with the U.S. system fur- 
ther augmented the information network. Whalemen lost a potential extension 
of the communications net when the Western Union Telegraph Company gave 
up plans to run a line through Canada and Alaska, across the Bering Strait, and 
through Russia to China and Japan. The company had not believed  that the 
Atlantic cable was possible; once the impossible was accomplished, the Orient 
was accessible via Europe. The company wound things up: “[Tlhe iron wires 
were sold to the Indians to be used for suspension bridges and fishing tackle, 
while the green-glass insulators supplied the Indians with drinking glasses for 
years” (Ahvenainen 1981, 30; see also Bright 1911; Tribolet [1929] 1972). 
The telegraph system was not extended to Honolulu in time to do whalemen 
much good. To do so was feasible at a fairly early date, but for some reason- 
perhaps the limited returns expected-the  line was not built until much later. 
7.6  Whalecraft Innovations 
In 1874 Charles M. Scammon (1968, 216) published the statement, “There 
has been as great a revolution in the mode of  killing whales during the past 
twenty  years,  as there has been in the art of  naval warfare;  were it not for 
this, but few whalers would now be afloat.” This section describes whalecraft 
innovations of the nineteenth century, investigates the speed with which they 
were adopted, and tests Scammon’s belief that the important innovations were 
produced and diffused within a short time.23 
In American-style whaling the attack was made from small, light but strong, 
double-ended, open boats-twenty-eight  to thirty feet long, six feet wide, and 
shallow. The craft had to be light because the whaling routine called for them 
to be lowered and then brought back aboard the vessel many times on a voyage. 
Lightness, shallow draft, and the design of hulls and oars made them relatively 
easy to row, an important characteristic, since the pursuit of  the whale often 
meant rowing for hours at a time. They had to be strong, to resist the “racking 
strains of being towed by the whale or being lowered and raised in the davits.” 
To  achieve this end, they were “clinker built. . . i.e. the thin boards that cover 
23. Much of the information on inventions comes from Lytle 1984. This excellent book is con- 
cerned chiefly with invention, per se, rathcr than  innovation and diffusion. See also Scammon 
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the ribs overlap one another, thus giving strength to the boat and enabling it to 
be made much lighter.” Finally,  they  had  to be seaworthy, since whalemen 
worked in all weathers, and over considerable distances: two boats of  the Es- 
sex,  after that vessel was sunk by a whale, sailed more than two thousand miles 
before they were picked up.” 
The equipment in the boat and the method of attack depended somewhat on 
the type of whale and the location of the chase. Gray whales and humpbacks 
were typically taken in bays, where the water was shallow enough for equip- 
ment that would be useless in the rougher and deeper waters outside. For ex- 
ample, since a humpback sinks when it dies, hunters carried buoys to mark the 
location  of  the carcass until  it rose  again to the  surface, but the technique 
worked only in shallow water. Anchors had uses in bay hunting, but none in 
the open sea. The Greener swivel harpoon gun was effective in bays, and it 
kept hunters a safer distance from the ferocious gray whale than did the stan- 
dard  harpoon,  but  the  Greener  was  rarely  used  by  American  open-sea 
whalemen because it was ineffective unless the seas were perfectly calm-an 
unusual  event on the ocean  Whalemen were reluctant  to  employ 
explosive devices against sperm whales. These animals travel in pods of fifteen 
to twenty, which would scatter at the sound of an explosion. Explosives were 
used in hunting right whales, since they travel alone or in very small groups. 
Bowheads posed peculiar problems. They could-and  did-seek  escape from 
hunters under the Arctic ice. In the bowhead fishery there was a premium on 
implements that  could stop the whale in its tracks; there, explosive devices 
were quickly adopted. 
Despite these variations the American system had some characteristics ob- 
servable in all the fisheries. We will take, first, the case of a vessel hunting 
sperm whales in the Pacific, and then examine the differences in other fisheries 
and other grounds. 
Slung from davits above the deck were four or five whaleboats; two or three 
spares were stored on skids above the poop. Men were in the crosstrees  on 
watch. When whales  were  sighted  and the vessel  had  been  maneuvered  to 
within about a mile of the pod, the boats were lowered to give chase. Each boat 
carried  six men-five  oarsmen (three starboard,  two port)  and a steersman 
(boatheader).  The latter was normally a mate, although it was not uncommon 
for the  captain, and occasionally  for an  extra-skilled  seaman, to  serve  as 
24. Ansel  1978, 2,  3; Olmsted  [I8411 1969, 19. The description  of  “clinker built”  is  from 
Olmsted. In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, boats were typically smaller than those 
described here and carried five men. See Macy [I8351 1970, 142. 
25. Lytle 1984, chaps. 4,6. The Florida was outfitted with a Greener and twenty irons in 1858. 
See Williams 1964,209. Part of this book is the diary of Eliza Azelia Williams, who went whaling 
with her husband and raised a family at sea. She describes the first mate’s shooting at fin whales 
from the deck of the vessel, probably with the Greener (47, 51). She does not report that he hit 
any finners with it, but once he shot (but lost) a humpback, while the gun was mounted in his 
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boatheader. With all the boats on the sea, two to five men were left aboard the 
ship to sail it, keep lookout, and signal the movements of the whales. 
A whaleboat was sailed when there was a wind and a good distance to go, 
but the sail was taken down and the oars unshipped  as the boat  neared the 
whales.  If  there was danger that the sounds of rowing would frighten them, 
paddles were used instead. 
A whaleboat was crowded with gear: a mast and a spritsail or lag sail, a long 
steering oar, five rowing oars, and paddles. In the center, between the rows of 
oarsmen, were two tubs filled with  line. The line in one tub was run to the 
stem, around the  loggerhead  (an  upright post),  and  then  forward, where it 
passed through a metal groove in the bow and was attached to the harpoons. 
The second tub contained spare line, spliced to the primary line and ready for 
use should the whale dive deep enough to require it. The boat  also carried, 
among other things, harpoons, lances, perhaps whale guns (more likely in right 
whaling),  and  cutting  implements  called  spades. All  told,  Scammon  says, 
something  like  eighty-two  items  of  gear  were  stored  aboard  the  typical 
whaleboat.26 
When a whale had been approached and the boat virtually  driven onto its 
back,  the boatheader  told  the  forward  starboard  oarsman-called  the  har- 
pooner or boatsteerer-to  rise and cast his harpoons. The harpooner tried to 
place two harpoons; if there wasn’t time to cast the second, it was stored in the 
bottom of  the boat, or, if already attached to the line, it was thrown over the 
side to prevent injury to men and craft. 
With the whale securely held by  the harpoons and the oars removed from 
the water, boatheader and harpooner changed places, harpooner now becoming 
boat~teerer.~’  Consider the character of this maneuver. Once the whale felt the 
harpoons, it usually swam off at a rapid clip; sperm whales have been known 
to move at a rate of twenty-five miles per hour. The line attached to the har- 
poons-it  ran down the center of  the boat, from stern to stem-paid  out so 
26. “The equipment belonging to a modem whale-boat consists of one mast and yard, or sprit, 
one to three sails (but usually a jib and mainsail), five pulling-oars, one steering-oar, five paddles, 
five rowlocks, five harpoons, one or two line-tubs (into which the line is coiled), three hand-lances, 
three short-warps, one boat-spade, three lance-warps, one boat-warp, one boat-hatchet, two boat- 
knives, one boat-waif, one boat-compass, one boat-hook, one drag, one grapnel, one boat-anchor, 
one sweeping-line, lead, buoy, etc., one boat-keg, one boat-bucket, one piggin, one lantern-keg 
(containing flint, steel, box of tinder, lantern, candles, bread, tobacco, and pipes), one boat-crotch, 
one tub-oar crotch, half a dozen chock-pins, a roll of canvas, a paper of tacks, two nippers, to 
which may be added a bomb-gun and four bomb-lances; in all, forty-eight articles, and at least 
eighty-two pieces” (Scammon [ 18741 1968,224-25). 
Scammon notes that “[tlhe full equipment as here enumerated, is modified to suit the particular 
branch of whaling pursued, as for instance, in deep-sea whaling there is no use for the anchor, and 
in sperm whaling the sweeping-line, buoy, etc., are not required; while in California Gray whaling 
in the bays or lagoons, the anchor is indispensable, and the grapnel, sweeping-line, lead, and buoy, 
are of much service. But many other articles are left out or supplied to a limited extent, so that the 
boat may be as light as possible, and work easily and quickly in shallow water.” 
27. The oar handles were set in cleats, to keep the blades out of the water. 286  Chapter 7 
fast that it could remove the arm  or leg of a man unlucky enough to be caught 
in one of its loops. The boat was small and narrow, and it was packed with 
gear. These were the circumstances in which the boatheader ran from stem to 
bow, passing the harpooner, who was moving back from bow to stern. If  all 
went well, the maneuver ended with the harpooner (now the boatsteerer) taking 
over the steering oar, and the boatheader standing in the bow with a spade or 
lance in his hand. If he had moved forward quickly enough, before the whale 
sounded, he slashed at it with his spade in an attempt to sever the tendons in 
its flukes  (tail) and cripple it. Unless they  were perfectly  executed, the ex- 
change of positions and the second physical assault on the whale could produce 
disaster for boat and men. In fact, the attempt to cut the tendons was so danger- 
ous that it was eventually abandoned by most whalemen. 
The purpose of  most harpoons was to hook the whale and attach it to the 
whaleboat. The injury rendered by the harpoon coupled with the weight of  the 
line and boat were intended to tire the whale and permit it to be approached 
again. Frequently the second approach took place only after many miles had 
been covered and many hours had passed. The actual killing was left to the 
boatheader, who stabbed the whale with a lance-a  long, handheld, spearlike 
implement. 
The hunting technique remained essentially unchanged, but over time the 
implements were improved significantly. The principal innovations were intro- 
duced between the late  1840s and the mid- 1860s, and they were widely dif- 
fused during the period of the American fleet’s decline. 
From the American point of view the most important innovations  in  har- 
poons  (called  irons  by  whalemen)  involved their design  and the  means  by 
which they were propelled  from boat to whale.  Both  sets of improvements 
were  intended to increase  the  probability  that,  once launched,  the  harpoon 
would fasten securely to the whale rather than missing completely or pulling 
loose. 
Innovations in design were numerous, and some were widely and quickly 
adopted. Although the variations  on each style were great, there were three 
basic types: the two-flued, the one-flued, and the toggle. The names are de- 
scriptive. The two-flued harpoon was shaped like an arrowhead, with  sharp 
leading edges designed to enter the whale smoothly and dull following edges 
intended to lodge in the flesh and secure the whale. Nonetheless, all too often 
the two-flued harpoon pulled out. The one-flued harpoon-with  only one fol- 
lowing edge-was  designed to minimize the chance that the whale would es- 
cape; it was widely  thought to be superior to its predecessor,  the two-flued. 
The point of the harpoon that entered the whale was narrow. When the whale 
pulled against it, the single barb-or  flue-caught  in its flesh, the soft neck of 
the iron bent, and the harpoon  turned parallel to the body of the whale, thus 
firmly attaching the animal to the line and, in turn, to the boat. The toggle iron 
achieved the same result more effectively. It turned on a pivot. When the har- 
poon was thrown, it was held in a fixed position-sharp  edges forward-by  a 287  Technology 
This advertisement in the Whalemenk Shipping List and Merchants'  Transcript for a 
manufacturer of  whalecraft shows a variety of implements available to the trade in the 
mid-nineteenth century. 
Reproduced courtesy of the Old Dartmouth Historical Society-New  Bedford Whal- 
ing Museum. 
small, light piece of  wood; when  the  harpoon  entered  the whale the  wood 
broke, the head turned, and the whale was securely hooked.28 
The toggle iron was first employed in 1848, and its effect on the industry 
28. See, for example, the favorable reports of  the toggle in the WSL  31 May,  19 July 1853. The 
first report (from the ship Ohio) asserts that twenty-two bowheads were hit and twenty-one cap- 288  Chapter 7 
was  immediate (Lytle  1984, 33). Between  May  1830 and November  1844 
James and Thomas Durfee, leading New Bedford manufacturers of whalecraft, 
produced 22,133 two-flued harpoons and none of any other design. Between 
November 1844 and May 1850 (only two years after the innovation of the tog- 
gle) they produced 7,791 harpoons-7,526  two-flued and 265 toggle irons. 
Between  May  1850 and  November  1862 the  numbers  were  almost equal: 
20,462 two-flued and 20,191 toggle.29  The outfitting books of the bark Ospray 
list 190 “common” irons and 50 toggle in 1854; 40 two-flued, 10 one-flued, 
and 60 toggle in 1866; and 10 two-flued, 11 one-flued, and 90 toggle in 1880.3” 
The bark Louisa camed all common irons in 1850; 130 common and 50 toggle 
in 1853; 42 each of the one- and two-flued and 100 of the toggle in 1856; 36 
two-flued, 20 one-flued, and 100 toggle in 1865; and 10 two-flued, 3 one-flued, 
and  120 toggle in  1874 (Lytle 1984, 16). In  1869 the bark  Globe listed 36 
toggle  and  none  of  any other kind.  Scammon ([1874]  1968, 316) recom- 
mended that a first-class whale ship on a Cape Horn voyage carry 15 two-flued 
harpoons and 150 toggle harpoons. 
The lessons are clear. The two-flued and toggle irons were the important 
designs; the one-flued had only a limited transitional significance. Moreover, 
while the toggle iron was adopted quickly and achieved an importance equal 
to the two-flued iron by the 185Os, it did not displace the older designs until 
the early 1870s. Even then, outfitting books typically called for a few common 
irons in addition to toggles. 
Most American  harpoons  were thrust or thrown-darted,  the whalemen 
said-by  hand. The harpoon was attached to the trunk of a sapling, its bark 
left on to improve the grip. The harpooner darted his pole and, if he was suc- 
cessful, the harpoon hooked the whale. The pole eventually fell out of the har- 
poon socket-it  was not attached to the socket by any fastener-and  floated 
away, leaving the whale effectively linked with the boat through the harpoon 
and its attached line. Even when the boatsteerer was extraordinarily powerful, 
the range of hand-thrown harpoons was very limited. Innovative efforts, there- 
fore, centered on new modes of  propulsion-guns  and, to deliver the newly 
invented rocket harpoons, rocket launchers. The latter resembled the bazooka 
of World War 11.  The swivel gun was invented in the early eighteenth century 
and figured in the Scotch and English fisheries, but never played a prominent 
role even there. It could not be accurately aimed in rough seas, and its kick 
often damaged the whaleboat. The latter consideration was of particular impor- 
tured, with only eight toggle irons. The second tells of the capture of forty-one whales with thirty- 
five toggles, none of which failed. 
29. Durfee Papers. Lytle (1984, 11, 172-74)  traces the careers of  the Durfees as blacksmiths, 
shipsmiths, and machinists. 
30. Ospray  1854,  1866, 1880. We  believe we have looked at every outfitting list and every 
record of a manufacturer of whalecraft housed in the Old Dartmouth Historical Society Whaling 
Museum, the Melville Room of the New Bedford Free Public Library, the libraries of Harvard 
University, and the G.  W.  Blunt White library at Mystic, Connecticut. 289  Technology 
tance to the Americans, whose whaleboats were lightly made. Thus the early 
swivel gun made no impact at all on the American fishery. 
In 1837 an English gunsmith, William Greener, produced an improved ver- 
sion of  the swivel gun. At that time it was not well  suited to the American 
fishery, and  few were employed. Within  two decades the discovery  of  new 
grounds made the Americans more receptive to its innovation. The Pacific gray 
whale migrates  each autumn from the North  Pacific to the Baja Peninsula, 
where its young are born and nurtured. Once these Lower California grounds 
were  discovered, Arctic  whalemen,  driven  out  by  advancing  ice  each  fall, 
found gray whales to be ideal off-season prey. They were trapped while tending 
their young in the confined spaces of the shallow Baja bays. The waters were 
calm enough to permit the effective use of the Greener, and the ferocity of the 
mothers protecting their young (whalemen called the gray whale the devilfish) 
made hunters grateful for the distance the swivel gun allowed them to keep. 
By 1850 the Greener was advertised in the WSL, and it soon made its mark in 
California bay whaling (Lytle 1984, 80-81).  It was not extensively employed 
in any other part of the American fishery. 
A whaleboat under sail-probably  off Baja California-approaches a gray whale. The 
man in the bow is prepared to fire his Greener gun as soon as the whale surfaces. 
This drawing was published in Charles M. Scammon’s  Marine Mammals in 1874. It 
is reproduced here courtesy of  the Old Dartmouth Historical Society-New  Bedford 
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The rocket launcher would seem to have represented a more promising line 
of development. It was light and did not have the kick of a gun. Both American 
and British  inventions  were patented as early as the  1820s, and the British 
version was said to have killed a large number of whales during its initial trials. 
Neither invention was widely adopted, and therefore neither had any signifi- 
cant impact on the whaling industry. Contemporaries viewed both as inventions 
that might provide a foundation for their attempts to hunt the fast-swimming 
rorquals,  which nineteenth-century whalers seldom managed to bring home. 
The blues, fins, seis, and minkes could not normally be approached and taken 
by conventional methods. Rocket launchers, advertised as capable of hitting a 
whale at a distance of forty yards or more, seemed to have solved this problem. 
There was also initially a hope that the rocket-driven  harpoon would over- 
come a second obstacle: rorquals tend to sink when  they are killed.  If  they 
were to be successfully hunted, a method had to  be developed to keep them 
afloat or to raise them from the deep. Among the rorquals, humpbacks fre- 
quented  shallow coves. There they could be killed by  conventional  methods 
and their bodies marked by buoys, to picked up days later when the accumulat- 
ing gases eventually forced carcasses to the surface. The blues and the fins- 
the largest and most numerous of the rorquals-could  not  be taken  in  this 
way. William Congreve, the inventor of the British rocket harpoon, believed 
his device would solve the problem. It included an explosive charge in the 
harpoon that could, he argued, both kill and physically alter the whale in a way 
that would keep the carcass afloat. In fact it did not. His harpoon killed a num- 
ber of rorquals, but most sank and were lost (Tonnesen and Johnsen 1982,18). 
It is not clear why the rocket harpoon was not employed in the sperm- and 
right-whale fisheries, where losses from sinking were negligible. In the case of 
sperm whales,  the explanation may  lie in the hunters’  recognition that  they 
could, if they were careful, take three or four whales from a pod by conven- 
tional methods. One shot from a rocket launcher would scatter the pod, and 
the hunter would have to settle for at most a single whale (if, of course, he was 
lucky enough to hit one). It may also be true that the rocket represented only a 
modest gain for right and bowhead whalemen. With it they might kill an occa- 
sional whale that the boats were unable to approach, but the gains with respect 
to the rest may not have been seen to be very great. 
Neither explanation  is  entirely  satisfactory. After  all, four  to  six  sperm- 
whaling boats, each armed with a rocket launcher, could surely get off four to 
six shots, rather  than one, before the pod  scattered. Furthermore, given the 
fighting abilities of sperm whales, harpooning from a distance ought to have 
reduced the loss of boats, equipment, and men. In the case of the bowhead, the 
rocket launcher would also appear to have had real virtues: a dead whale can- 
not escape under the Arctic ice. Nonetheless, the rocket launcher was nearly 
confined to the rorqual fisheries, and Americans hunted few rorquals. 
The two Americans  who employed  the rocket  launcher most extensively 
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York, who opened the Western Arctic hunting grounds, and Gustavus A. Lilien- 
dahl, of New York City, an explosives expert. Roys patented rockets and their 
launchers in 1861, 1862, 1866 (with Liliendahl), and 1879 (the last patent was 
granted two years after his death). He joined with Liliendahl in an effort to use 
the rocket to hunt fins and blues off the coast of Iceland, a venture that was 
continued by Liliendahl after he and Roys parted company. The partners em- 
ployed  steamboats to tow whaleboats  to the hunting ground. When whales 
were sighted, the whaleboats were released to launch the attack. The rocket 
was intended not only to kill the whale but also, like a conventional harpoon, 
to fasten it securely to the whaleboat. If  the whale sank, the steamboat was 
standing by and could winch it up. Once secured, the whale was towed by the 
larger vessel to a shore station for processing. There was, however, a grave 
danger that the whale would be attached to the whaleboat while still alive. In 
that case the whaleboat and crew were likely to be taken on a ride at speeds 
much greater than were encountered  on the sleigh rides of the conventional 
whale fishery. 
The Roys-Liliendahl firm managed to kill some whales, but captured only 
about one-half of those destroyed-a  much poorer record than that of the con- 
ventional industry. The firm also experienced severe financial difficulties, and 
in  1867, a year after the partnership broke up, it failed. The Roys technique 
continued to be used until the early  187Os, but only a few whales were cap- 
tured. Altogether, in all years, Roys’s innovation killed fewer than 150  rorquals. 
There is a strong suggestion that the method was not widely imitated because 
it was technically flawed, but it is possible that the problem lay at least in part 
with Roys’s and Liliendahl’s inadequate business sense and managerial  skill^.^' 
Conventional harpoons did not kill whales, but only hooked them. Whales 
were actually killed by a lance-a  spearlike implement. Harpoons were made 
of iron, the shank of soft iron that allowed it to bend under pressure, reducing 
the likelihood that the head would pull out of  the whale. Hand lances were 
stabbing instruments, not hooks. To permit the boatheader to strike again and 
again, they were designed to be easily thrust into the whale and easily with- 
drawn. The body of the lance was usually made of tough wrought iron mounted 
on a pole, but the head was frequently made of steel. Steel was preferred; it 
completely displaced wrought iron “after steel was produced in quantity in this 
country” (Lytle 1984, 133). The substitution was presumably associated with 
a decline in the relative price of steel, which fell particularly sharply after 1867. 
If  the ratio of  steel to wrought-iron prices in 1867 is taken as a base of  one 
hundred, the relative price of  steel fell to seventy-two  in  1875 and to fifty- 
three in  1882 (Swank 1892, 514). Agent response was swift; outfitting lists 
immediately reflected the change: the lists for the Emily Morgan (1  842) and 
31. Tamessen and Johnsen 1982, 18-20; Lytle 1984, chap. 6.  Tflnnessen and Johnsen cite busi- 
ness problems. Lytle (128) records the following words from the posthumous patent: “These last 
improvements made by  Roys are intended to remedy the defects in the implement as formerly 
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the ships Julius Caesar (I  837), Magnolia (1  842), and Francis Henrietta (1  843) 
mention no steel-headed lances, while those for the barks Globe (1869) and 
Mary Frazier ( 1876) mention no iron-headed lances. Scammon’s best-practice 
list ([  18741 1968, 3 16) for the early 1870s also contains no hand lances with 
iron  heads.  The Ospray (1854,  1868) carried half  common  and  half  steel- 
headed lances in 1854, but its outfit changed to all steel-headed by  1868. 
The substitution of steel for iron was not the only potential improvement in 
the lance that inventors offered. At one time or another, they suggested heating, 
electrifying, and poisoning the lance.32  None of these plans came to much. Not 
surprisingly, crewmen concluded that, if the poison killed the whale, it might 
also kill them when they handled the blubber. 
The problems of making the lance explosive were more tractable. The de- 
vices developed-some  intended to kill by driving a lance head deep into the 
whale, others, by the force of the explosion-were  usually part of an innova- 
tion that also included a mechanism for delivering the lance. The first of these 
was handheld  and was similar to a shotgun. Unfortunately,  it had a kick so 
strong that the boatheader was often thrown to the bottom of the boat. Some- 
times his collarbone was broken; sometimes the craft was capsized. Consider- 
able inventive effort was directed toward  dealing  with  these  problems,  and 
eventually  the Allen gun-more  frequently called the Brand gun  because it 
was developed and promoted by C. C. Brand-achieved  wide a~ceptance.~’ 
The progress of  the shoulder gun is exhibited nicely in the outfitting lists of 
the bark Ospray: those for 185  1 and 1854 show no whale guns; those for 1866 
and  1868 show three (fewer than one per boat); the number rose to six at the 
beginning of the 1870s; it was still six (one per boat plus two spares) a decade 
later. The bark Globe carried four in  1869, and Scammon in the early  1870s 
(1968,3  16) called for four on his Cape Horn whaler. The Lottie Beard, a resup- 
ply vessel, carried eight boxes of guns and lances in  1886 (Lottie Beurd Ac- 
32. Similar means were attempted to make harpoons deadly. Lytle’s comment (1984, 134) on 
the prussic-acid lance probably can be applied to the rest as well: “It is doubtful that this type of 
lance was ever used in the American whale fishery.” It was used in the English fishery at least 
once, with great success-that  is, it killed the whale. However, the WSL  (14 August 1860) reported 
that “the men were so appalled by the terrific effect of the poisoned harpoon that they declined to 
use any more of them.” The electric harpoon was a German innovation that was reported to have 
been used in the Pacific by vessels sailing from Bremen, as well as by French vessels. The appara- 
tus consisted of a 350-pound battery and a hand-cranked generator. The inventor claimed great 
success for it, but  it seems not to have had  much impact on the industry, certainly not  on the 
American industry. See the stories in the WSL  of 8 June, 5 July, 3 August 1852, and 12 April 1853. 
33. The first report of a bomb lance in the WSL was on 17 August 1847: “The whole apparatus 
is certainly ingenious; whether or not it is really an improvement on the present mode of killing 
whales, is more than we are able to say.” By 13 November 1855 the newspaper was able to assert, 
“Guns for driving the harpoon have, we believe, been pretty generally abandoned,” but the bomb 
lance was being used “quite extensively.” See also stories and advertisements on  14 December 
1852 (reporting an accident with an exploding whale gun), 16 November 1852, 7 June 1853, 11 
July  1854 (reporting that the problem of the kick had been solved in  the new Brown gun), 25 
December 1855.26 May  1857, 8 June 1858, 14 September 1858, 5 October 1858, 13 December 
1859, and 27 September 1864. 293  Technology 
count Book). The order books of Frank E. Brown, a New Bedford seller of 
whaling  implements,  show the  sale of  1,906 feathered  lances (for shoulder 
guns) and 921 long or unspecified  lances (presumably all handheld) in  1877 
and 1878. In the fall of  1899 and the spring of  1900, Brown listed only feath- 
ered lances and lances for darting 
Reports from the fleet indicate the effectiveness of the bomb lance. In 1850 
the Parker Cook of  Providence confronted a very large, angry sperm whale 
that had already “eaten up” two of her boats. The beast “made for the vessel, 
striking her in the bows, and knocking the cutwater aside, but without doing 
much more damage. The ferocious monster was then attacked from the bark, 
with the Patent Whaling Gun and Bomb Lance, and after receiving three lances 
was dispatched.” The WSL (11 November  1851) commented: “In the case of 
the Ann Alexandel; if  Capt. Deblois had  used the Bomb Lance it would no 
doubt have prevented the loss of his ship. . . .  Most of the ships fitted this year, 
are supplied with this apparatus.” 
In 1855 ( 13 November) the newspaper reported: 
[Tlhe extent to which gunpowder is now being employed in the manufacture 
or rather in the capture of oil, is perhaps little suspected by the mass of our 
readers. Guns for driving the harpoon have, we believe, been pretty gener- 
ally abandoned, but we are assured by a manufacturer of fuse, who has lately 
contracted for making a quality especially adapted to this sub-marine and 
blubbery location, that the bomb-lance is now being quite extensively em- 
ployed by many vessels, and that some have sent home from the Sandwich 
Islands for further supplies. 
The manufacturer’s story was confirmed by the report from Honolulu of Cap- 
tain Cleaveland  of the ship Julien, who noted  that he had  on board eleven 
hundred barrels of oil and that he “had taken most of his whales with the bomb 
lance” (WSL  25 December 1855). 
Three years later the paper (8 June 1858) sang the further praises of the new 
technology, and acknowledged its widespread innovation. 
The most ugly species of whale to take is said to be the “California greys.” 
They are extremely shy, and when after a long chase, or by surprise, an iron 
is fastened in them they can run as fast as a locomotive, dive to the bottom 
of the ocean, or more frequently turn upon the boat and crush it to atoms 
with their flukes. . . . The Bomb Lance has, consequently, become an indis- 
pensable article in the outfit of these whalers-Some  ships carry one gun 
for each boat, while others take only one or two. The guns cost from $40 to 
$50 each, and the bombs $3.50 a piece. 
34. Order Book, Whaling Implements, 1877-1922,  Brown Collection. Butler (1973,42) points 
out  that the bomb lances were particularly useful in the Arctic, to keep whales from escaping 
under the ice. “Since this was not a problem when hunting the sperm whale, and because the 
noise of the guns scattered the other whales in the school, sperm whalemen made less use of 
these weapons.” 294  Chapter 7 
The last significant innovation in whalecraft combined characteristics of the 
harpoon and the whaling gun. The darting, or Pierce, gun was mounted on the 
staff of  a harpoon. When the harpoon was darted into the whale, a lever was 
depressed,  the  gun  fired, and  an  explosive lance  was  driven  deep into the 
whale.  The Pierce gun delivered  the explosive lance much more accurately 
than a shoulder gun. The location of the gun-close  to the whale when it went 
off-meant  that the lance was sent into the whale with great power, but did 
not convey a recoil to the boat. Finally, the weapon usually stopped the whale, 
preventing the long struggles that were common when a standard harpoon was 
thrown. In the Arctic, with the danger that a harpooned whale would dive under 
the ice, this feature was particularly important. 
The darting gun was probably the most effective single piece of whalecraft 
introduced into the American fishery in the nineteenth century; its development 
and diffusion,  however, came late. It was  invented in  1865 but  not  widely 
adopted until the 1870s. The outfitting books of the Ospray, for example, make 
no mention of darting guns in the late 1860s and early 187Os, but two of them 
plus thirty-one lances appear in  1880. In  1874 Scammon (1968, 316) called 
for four-one  per boat-and  fifty darting-gun bomb lances. Clearly Scammon 
saw important uses for the darting gun, but even he did not believe it would 
replace all its predecessors-his  list also includes 35 steel-headed lances, 4 
whaling guns other than the darting guns, and 150 shoulder gun bomb lances. 
The Frank E. Brown order books show a steady increase in the relative impor- 
tance of the darting gun: the fraction of lances that fit it rose from 7 percent in 
1877, to 9 percent in 1878, to 14 percent in 1879, to 41 percent in the fall of 
1899. That Brown sold only eight Brand shoulder guns between the beginning 
of  1877 and the end of  1879, while disposing of eighty-one Pierce guns, is an 
even clearer indication of the change then under way. 
In summary, the most significant innovations in whalecraft  were made be- 
tween 1848 and 1865, and they were widely diffused from the 1850s through 
the early  1880s. The order of invention and adoption ran about as follows: 
toggle iron (1848-70),  steel-head lance (1855-70),  shoulder gun (1855-70), 
darting gun (186540). From the date of the widespread diffusion of the toggle 
iron (mid-1850s) to the period of  general adoption of the darting gun  is an 
interval of about twenty-five years. During that quarter century, the markets for 
sperm and whale oil were contracting, and the industry was contracting along 
with  them. Whalecraft innovations, like the improvements in rig and vessel 
design, enhanced productivity and slowed the industry’s decline. 
7.7  Institutional Innovation 
As long as whaling voyages were restricted to the North Atlantic, they were 
relatively short. The vessel returned periodically to its home port, off-loaded 
oil and bone, reprovisioned, acquired new outfits, filled vacancies in the crew, 
and set off on its next voyage. As new hunting grounds were developed, voyage 295  Technology 
length increased. Just to reach the Indian Ocean, the Pacific Ocean, or the 
Western Arctic took months of sailing. A vessel that returned to New Bedford 
after a year or so at sea did not make a very efficient use of its capital. 
Vessels began to remain away for three and four years. Supplies ran out. 
Crews were depleted by injury, death, and desertion. Accidents called for re- 
pairs; hulls had to be scraped, and worn-out gear had to be replaced. Oil and 
bone had to be shipped home. 
The facilities of ports on the west coast of Panama, in California, in Hawaii, 
and on the west coast of Australia developed to meet these requirements. Ves- 
sels could put in to such towns, send injured crewmen ashore, and recruit re- 
placements. Provisions were taken aboard, including fresh fruits and vegeta- 
bles to fend off scurvy. Supply ships from New Bedford brought whalecraft to 
replace the harpoons, lances, bombs, and guns used up in the hunt; they also 
brought mail. By prearrangement, instructions from agents were picked up by 
whaling captains, and news of the hunt was sent back to New Bedford. Agents 
formed business connections in resupply  ports that made it possible for cap- 
tains to be supplied with cash. U.S.  consuls provided help in dealing with local 
laws and customs. 
By permitting longer voyages and by making vessels less dependent on their 
home ports, the rise of  these towns changed the nature of  the industry. The 
reprovisioning towns, indeed, took on the character of alternative home ports. 
Once the Western Arctic became a premier hunting ground and the transconti- 
nental railroads were in place, the connections with New England were attenu- 
ated for many vessels, and San Francisco played a more important role in their 
activities than did New Bedford. 
This institutional innovation affected not only the whaling fleets but also the 
resupply ports themselves. Perth became a whaling boom town, as did many 
other resupply ports, but the economic gains were not without costs. The costs 
were  often due to the behavior  of the rough  seamen loosed on the port by 
visiting whalers-crewmen  anxious to erase the memory of tedious days and 
nights afloat, many with diseases to be passed on to the residents of the town. 
Hawaiian culture suffered from the intrusion of western sailors; all the resup- 
ply towns were unusually violent places.3s 
Compared  with  the  important  changes  in  vessel  design,  rigging,  and 
whalecraft, the innovation of transshipment points appeared relatively early in 
the nineteenth century. Demand developed as soon as vessels began to sail to 
the South Atlantic, and it became more pronounced once whalers had begun 
seriously to hunt the Indian and Pacific Oceans. The use of resupply and trans- 
shipment ports must be dated to the 1820s; they became important elements in 
the story by the 1830s. 
35. The first American whaler to make port in the Hawaiian Islands was the Balena, registered 
in New Bedford, Edmund Gardner, master. She arrived in the fall of  1819 (Judd 1974, 17). See 
Morgan 1948.82-85.  for an account of the impact of the whaling industry on Hawaiian economy 
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Improvements  in the design of  the capital stock also date from the  1820s, 
but the most pronounced developments did not occur until the second half of 
the century. During the 185Os, 186Os, and 1870s the speed with which innova- 
tions  in the design of  hulls, rigging, and whalecraft took place accelerated. 
These developments were important because there were forces at work during 
these decades tending to drive productivity down. For example, the quality 
of crews was declining. The innovations were a countervailing force, pushing 
productivity upward. Which set of forces was the more powerful? The question 
is treated in the next chapter. 